Indicators of Potential Conflict. by Murshed, S.M. (Syed)
Indicators of Potential 
Conflict
  MICROCON Policy Briefing 1  February 2008             S. Mansoob Murshed
Summary:  This paper focuses on the main factors that contrib-
ute to the dangers of violent internal conflict erupting, or re-ig-
niting after a peace has been concluded. The conflict literature 
has identified greed and grievance as the principle causes of 
conflict. But for either of them to take the form of large-scale vi-
olence there must be other factors at work, specifically a weak-
ening of the ʻsocial contractʼ.  Such a viable social contract can 
be sufficient to restrain opportunistic behaviour such as theft of 
resource rents and violent expression of grievance. The social 
contract, therefore, refers to the mechanisms and institutions of 
peaceful conflict resolution. Three main risk factors are consid-
ered in this briefing: The breakdown of redistributive mecha-
nisms, democratic transitions and lack of economic progress.
•What causes the mecha-
nisms underlying a social 
contract to degenerate? 
•What circumstances cre-
ate incentives for groups 
within societies to choose 
war rather than resolve 
disputes peacefully?
What causes the mechanisms un-
derlying a social contract to degen-
erate? The term failed state is inap-
propriate, as very few states actually 
fail totally; there is degeneration 
rather than the total breakdown of 
the social contract. So what factors 
lead to the breakdown of the social 
contract within a nation state? What 
circumstances create incentives for 
groups within societies to choose 
war rather than resolve disputes 
peacefully? 
There are three main risk factors in 
the breakdown of the social con-
tract:
1) Redistributive mechanisms
Within nation states, the fiscal sys-
tem will secure a workable social 
contract if the allocation of public 
expenditures and the apportionment 
of taxes are judged to be fair, or at 
least not so unfair that some groups 
judge taking resources by force the 
better option. There are many ex-
amples of conflicts emerging out 
of fiscal disputes. Côte dʼIvoire, 
for instance, became unstable with 
the collapse of the social contract 
engineered by the late President 
Houphouët-Boigny, in which he al-
located public spending across the 
regions to successfully buy the loy-
alty of the countryʼs ethnic groups. 
Disputes over the apportionment 
of revenues from natural resources 
are especially common and, as in 
Indonesia and Nigeria, these take 
on ethnic and regional dimensions. 
Contemporary civil wars are more 
often related to the breakdown of 
explicit or implicit arrangements to 
share resources or revenues, rather 
than the absence of an agreement to 
share resources or rents. One reason 
that a contract to share revenues en-
counters difficulties is the imperfect 
credibility with which the side that 
controls the ʻpot  ʼhonours its com-
mitment. Indeed, the presence or 
discovery of oil or gas may promote 
secessionist tendencies among 
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groups who do not wish to share it 
with the rest of the nation.  
2) Democratic transitions
Political science research points out 
that the risk of conflict is lower in 
both well established democracies 
and autocracies. It suggests that 
conflict risk is at its highest during 
transitions to and away from democ-
racy when state capacity is weak, 
and also in fledgling and imperfect 
democracies (anocracies). There is 
more violent expression of griev-
ances during early democratic phas-
es as the aggrieved feel suddenly 
empowered. Most developing coun-
tries are imperfect democracies, or 
at an early stage of the democratic 
transition. In the interim between 
full-blown forms of either autocracy 
or democracy (anocracy) countries 
may have electoral processes which 
characterise democracy, co-existing 
with weak or non-existent separa-
tion of powers between the execu-
tive and the judiciary in particular. 
This not only prevents them from 
functioning like true democracies, 
but impairs governance, especially 
the rule of law. Another problem is 
the widespread electoral violence in 
anocracies. Finally, there is the risk 
that new democracies can periodi-
cally slide back to autocracy engen-
dering a vicious cycle of democracy 
to autocracy, back to democracy 
and so on. 
Given the imperfect nature of de-
mocracies and good governance in 
most developing countries we need 
to be cognizant of the motivation 
and incentives of their rulers. With 
regard to incentives faced by rulers 
in developing countries, it has to be 
remembered that until the end of the 
cold war most developing countries 
were ruled by strong men. In other 
words, they were autocracies. Some 
promoted development, others did 
not. Compare Mobutuʼs Zaire 
Soldiers patrolling the streets of Kathmandu during a curfew in Nepal © Panos
(1965-1997) to Suhartoʼs Indonesia 
(1965-98). In Indonesia and Zaire 
resource flows were volatile. In one 
case the dictator (Suharto) chose di-
versification and growth enhancing 
strategies, as well as policies aimed 
at equalisation and poverty reduc-
tion to contain political opposition. 
Development in Indonesia was im-
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At a higher income people have a lot more to lose from violent 
forms of conflict resolution
pressive, and may have led, at least 
partially, to endogenous demands 
for democracy. In the other case 
(Zaire, now DRC), Mobutu did not, 
because he felt that diversification 
and investment in infrastructure 
would loosen his grip on power and 
strengthen political opposition to 
him based on ethnicity. Zaire or the 
DRC has perhaps the poorest post-
1960 growth record in the planet. 
Perhaps, in East Asia greater fears 
of communism strengthened benev-
olence in dictators (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Indonesia), 
whereas in Africa a certain type of 
factionalism dominated policies 
and politics, retarding growth en-
hancing economic diversification 
and infrastructural development.
3) The lack of economic progress
The most robust indicator that pre-
dicts the risk of conflict is the lack of 
economic growth and development 
in low income countries. In fact, at 
a higher income people have a lot 
more to lose from violent means 
of conflict resolution.  The lack of 
growth also increases vulnerability 
to economic shocks. Furthermore, 
the absence of economic growth 
retards institutional development 
(democracy and governance), con-
tributing to the risk of armed con-
flict. It is no surprise that most rich 
countries are peaceful democracies. 
Also, the stateʼs capacity to either 
assuage (through transfers) or sup-
press (by armed force) malcontents 
is weaker the poorer the country in 
question. By the same token, post-
conflict economic recovery must be 
inclusive and broad-based to pre-
vent a new outbreak of grievances.
Synthesis 
To get an empirical feel for some of 
these channels, a descriptive look 
at the data may be in order. Table 1 
presents the 17 countries with the 
highest conflict incidence since 
1960. We compare growth rates, 
the combined democracy and au-
tocracy score known as Polity1, en-
dowment type and conflict intensity 
or incidence in selected developing 
countries during the period 1965-
2000. The Polity score is an imper-
fect proxy for institutional capacity 
and governance, but we have good 
time series data on these. This is 
coded 1 for autocracies (those with 
an autocracy score below -4), 3 for 
democracies (for democracy scores 
above 4) and 2 for anocracies that 
have both democratic and auto-
cratic characteristics (with scores of 
between -4 and 4). The endowment 
typology is based upon a countryʼs 
principal exports2,  and is subject to 
change. Note that countries can have 
more than one year of civil war in 
any given calendar year if there are 
several conflicts taking place within 
the nation simultaneously (Burma, 
India etc.). 
From this, we can make a number 
of observations:
(a) Only five of these high conflict 
incidence nations reported in Table 
1 have a per-capita income growth 
rate in excess of 2% per annum in 
the long-term: Indonesia, India, 
Sri Lanka, Colombia and Uganda. 
Generally speaking, poor growth 
performers have more conflict years 
in Table 1. Furthermore, only three 
point-sourced countries and four 
coffee/cocoa economies did not 
descend into some form of civil 
war. Diffuse economies also have 
conflict; examples of the high inci-
dence of civil wars occurring in dif-
fuse economies are in South Asia, 
the Philippines and Burma, as well 
as Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 
Africa. In total, eight out of thirty 
diffuse economies have avoided 
civil war, a record that is better than 
for point-sourced and coffee/cocoa 
Country Conflict inci-














177 1 1.5% Diffuse, Point
India 104 3 2.4% Manufacturing
Ethiopia 81 1 -0.3% Coffee/Cocoa
Philippines 59 1;2;3 0.9% Diffuse, Manu-
facturing
Iraq 57 1 -3.5% Point
Angola 43 1 -2.1% Point
Iran 41 1;2 -1.0% Point
Algeria 37 1;2 1.0% Point
Chad 36 1 -0.6% Point
Colombia 35 3 2.1% Coffee/Cocoa
Indonesia 32 1 4.8% Point, Manu-
facturing
Guatemala 31 1;2 0.7% Coffee/Cocoa
Sudan 31 1;2;3 0.5% Diffuse, Point
South Africa 31 2 0% Point
Mozambique 27 1 1.3% Diffuse
Uganda 23 1;2 2.5% Coffee, Cocoa
Sri Lanka 22 3 3.0% Diffuse, Manu-
facturing
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Table 1: Conflict years, Growth, Polity and Economic Typology
Source: Murshed 2006 Table 4
based economies. Manufacturing 
exporters are least likely to expe-
rience outright civil war. Perhaps, 
this is because they have the best 
growth rates and institutional qual-
ity. They are also more diversified 
economies, and are able to with-
stand the commodity price and na-
tional income fluctuations that make 
growth failure more likely. Growth 
also needs to be pro-poor, which ul-
timately means less inequality, so 
as to minimise the effects of group 
inequalities and polarisation.
(b) It is discernable that India, Sri 
Lanka and Colombia are the stable 
democracies in the post 1960 era 
that have had civil wars, including 
high intensity conflict. Many of the 
transitions in regime type from au-
tocracy to anocracy to democracy 
(during 1960-2000) are described in 
Murshed (2006). Multiple switches 
in all directions are possible, and not 
just from autocracy to democracy. 
Nevertheless, only 5 out of the sev-
enteen nations with a high conflict 
incidence have ever been democra-
cies with a democracy score over 4. 
Democracy, even stable democracy, 
does not guarantee the absence of 
armed conflict, both of the seces-
sionist and rebel varieties, as the 
examples of India, Colombia, Sri 
Lanka, the Philippines and others 
indicate. Autocracies also fall into 
conflict; nevertheless, stable autoc-
racies such as China and Singapore 
have avoided civil war, as did Tai-
wan and South Korea which be-
came democracies recently. Despite 
prominent outliers such as  India, 
Colombia, and Saudi Arabia, most 
conflict prone countries are neither 
stable democracies nor autocracies,
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lending support to the finding that 
conflict risk is greatest when regime 
types are in transition, say from au-
tocracy to democracy.  
Conclusion
Problems associated with the demo-
cratic transition, the degeneration of 
redistributive mechanisms and the 
lack of economic growth contrib-
ute to long-term conflict risk. Their 
short-term manifestations take the 
form of the inability to cope with 
economic shocks (associated with 
falling export prices or natural ca-
lamities), or violent political insta-
bility. Either way, there are plenty of 
indicators of both for observers and 
policy makers to see; in many cas-
es they will benefit from exchang-
ing information. Decision makers 
in developed countries like the EU 
then need to decide when, where 
and how to intervene---the extent 
of their reaction is something that is 
ultimately related to their own po-
litical incentives and imperatives.   
Endnotes
1. These scores range from -10 to 0 for au-
tocracy, and 0 to 10 for democracies, mak-
ing -10 the greatest autocracy score, and 10 
the highest democracy score; see Murshed 
(2006) for further details.
2. This is based on a countryʼs principal ex-
ports, which are described as point (mineral 
or fuel), coffee-cocoa, diffuse (other agri-
cultural) or manufacturing, where arguably 
dependence on mineral or fuel exports ex-
ante enhances the risk of conflict.
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